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This paper takes advantage of unique intra-country 
variation in the Philippines power sector to examine 
under what conditions politicians have an incentive to 
“capture” an electric utility and use it for the purposes 
of rent-seeking. The authors hypothesize that the level 
of capture is determined by the incentives of, and the 
interactions between, local and national politicians, 
where the concepts of “local” and “national” are context 
specific. A local politician is defined as one whose 
electoral jurisdiction lies within the utility’s catchment 
area; by contrast, a national politician is defined as one 
whose electoral jurisdiction includes two or more utility 
catchment areas. These jurisdictional differences imply 
different motivations for local and national politicians: 
because of “spillover” effects, local politicians have a 
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greater incentive to use the utility for rent-seeking than a 
national politician as they capture only a portion of the 
political gains from utility performance improvements 
as some of the benefits of improved service will go to 
other electoral jurisdictions within the utility’s catchment 
area. The authors posit that three variables impact the 
magnitude of these incentives of local and national 
politicians: (i) the local economic context, specifically 
the scale of rents that can be extracted from an electricity 
cooperative (ii) the degree of competitiveness of local 
politics; and (iii) the political salience of an electricity 
cooperative’s catchment area for national politicians. The 
authors illustrate this framework through case studies 
of specific power utilities, and suggest some policy 
implications.  
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It is commonly known that public utilities in developing countries are particularly susceptible to 
political capture and that the use of these utilities for the purposes of rent-seeking is a major cause 
of their poor performance (Shirley 2002, Lal 2006).  What is less well known however, is what 
drives this political capture in specific contexts — under what conditions politicians are more 
likely to interfere in the day-to-day operations of utilities and when will they have less incentive 
to do so.  This paper takes advantage of unique intra-country variation in the Philippines power 
sector to show that rents do indeed drive capture, but the effect is contingent on the nature of 
local political competition.   
 
Electric cooperatives (ECs) provide power to roughly half of the households in the Philippines 
and are the main, if not exclusive, distribution utilities for consumers who live outside of the 
major metropolitan areas.  While the overall financial health of the sector has improved steadily 
over the past decade, there is great diversity among the 119 cooperatives that exist, and many 
cooperatives  continue  to  have  high  technical  and  financial  losses,  and  require  government 
subsidies.    An  earlier  World  Bank  study  of  the  sector  identified  a  variety  of  geographical, 
regulatory, and corporate governance factors behind this variation in performance, but speculated 
that  undue  political  interference  in  management  as  the  core  issue,  and  the  minimization  of 
political interference and the maximization of professional management as the heart of the reform 
agenda for the sector (World Bank 2000).   
 
This  paper  takes  these  observations  as  a  point  of  departure  and  explores  what  explains  the 
variations in the level of politicization of ECs across the Philippines.  If it can be accepted that 
ceteris paribus, a public entity such as an electricity cooperative will perform better under a 
professional manager with relevant technical expertise and experience than otherwise, then an 
alternative way to pose the same question would be: why are some ECs used for serving the 
interests  of  politicians  and  a  small  number  of  their  supporters  through,  for  example,  regular 
interference in day-to-day management in matters involving procurement, personnel recruitment 
and management, billing, and electrification while others are left alone to be run professionally by 
the  ECs‘  managers?    This  research  question  draws  on  the  earlier  finding  that  the  level  of 
politicization has a major impact on EC performance, and therefore a framework that explains the 
variation  in  levels  of  politicization  will  also  explain  a  large  part  of  the  variation  in  EC 
performance and therefore electricity service provision in the Philippines.    
 
The paper‘s main contribution is the development of an analytical framework, what we refer to as 
the  ‗political  economy  of  nested  capture‘,  to  explain  this  variation.    To  put  simply,  we 
hypothesize that the level of politicization of an EC is determined by the incentives of, and the 
interactions between, local and national politicians, where the concepts of local and ―national‖ 
are context specific.  A local politician is defined as one whose electoral jurisdiction lies within 
an EC‘s catchment area or, to state in another way, an EC catchment area contains two or more 
such electoral jurisdictions.  By contrast, a national politician is defined as one whose electoral 
jurisdiction includes two or more EC catchment areas.  In the Philippines context, given that a 
typical EC will include multiple municipalities and congressional districts, mayors and national 
congressmen can be considered local politicians.  By contrast provincial governors usually, and in 
the extreme case the president, are national politicians. 
 
These jurisdictional differences imply different motivations for local and national politicians with 
respect to the EC.  Each politician faces a choice: to use the EC as a source of rents to finance 3 
 
their electoral campaigns and to build alliances with locally influential individuals who can help 
them in elections, or to help the EC be run professionally to improve electricity services.  While 
using  the  EC as  a source  of rents  can  help finance  elections  and  other  political  needs (e.g., 
maintenance of a private militia in extreme cases) it also imposes a cost to the locality in terms of 
production losses due to poor power supply.   Presumably improved power supply would help the 
politician get elected; however, a local politician can capture only a portion of the political gains 
from EC performance improvements as some of the benefits of improved service will go to other 
electoral jurisdictions within the EC‘s catchment area.  By contrast, a national politician can 
capture all of the political benefits of improved services but the EC is likely to be only a small 
source of rents given the size of their electoral jurisdictions.  The implication therefore, is that 
local politicians have a greater incentive to use the EC as a source of rents and a lesser incentive 
to improve service delivery than national politicians.  The latter, on the other hand, may have 
greater incentive to keep the EC performing well, but given the typically limited scope of EC 
operations in their electoral jurisdiction (i.e., nation- or province-wide), the EC is expected to 
occupy only limited space on their political calculation, dampening their incentives to actively 
intervene in its management and operations. 
 
We posit that three variables impact the magnitude of these incentives of local and national 
politicians: (i) the local economic context, specifically the scale of rents that can be extracted 
from an EC (ii) the degree of competitiveness of local politics (where local is defined as above); 
and (iii) the political salience of an EC‘s catchment area for national politicians.  On the first 
point, a large EC in a largely agrarian economy will be a big source of rent but would impose 
fewer costs in terms of production losses than a smaller EC in an industrial area where the costs 
of disrupted power will be higher.  The more competitive the local election, the more the need for 
local politicians to use these rents to target key voters to swing an election or otherwise obtain an 
advantage over the political rival, and conversely the more likely that these targeted interventions 
would be successful (as relatively fewer votes need to be ‗bought‘).  The greater the political 
salience of the EC catchment area, the greater the incentive of a national politician to intervene 
and to prevent the EC‘s poor performance from becoming a national political issue.  The level of 
politicization of an EC, and therefore its performance, will then be a function of these three 
variables. 
 
This finding that rent-seeking is actually greater in settings that are more electorally competitive 
is surprising but consistent with that of a rich academic literature on analytical political economy 
that  has  explored  the  limitations  of  elections  for  holding  politicians  accountable,  and  the 
incentives of politicians to provide targeted benefits to particular constituents (―pork-barrel‖ or 
―clientelist‖  policies)  as  opposed  to  public  goods  that  benefit  a  large  number  of  voters.    In 
applying these insights to a particular sector in a particular country, the paper attempts to provide 
additional  insights  into  politicians‘  incentives  controlling  for  many  of  the  features,  such  as 
institutional  structures  (presidential  vs.  parliamentary  systems,  coalition  vs.  majority 
governments), electoral systems (majoritarian vs. proportional), and societal features (ethnically 
divided vs. homogenous) that the literature has emphasized as key explanatory variables.  It is 
also hoped that the analytical framework will prove useful for the analysis of rent-seeking in 
other sectors, particularly in the infrastructure sectors with similarly high political visibility such 
as water supply and sanitation, and roads and transportation.   
 
The paper is structured as follows: the next section provides background on the power sector in 
the Philippines, giving an overview of the legal and institutional framework governing ECs, and 
of sector performance.  Section 3 summarizes the relevant theoretical and Philippines-specific 
academic political economy literature.  Section 4, the theoretical core of the paper, presents the 
political economy of nested capture framework.  Section 5 puts some flesh to this framework by 4 
 
through case studies of select ECs — these cases are illustrative and are not meant to be a ―test‖ 
of the theoretical argument.  The final section presents some implications of the analysis for 





Electric cooperatives as the institutional mechanism for rural electrification in the Philippines had 
their genesis in the 1960s with the launch of pilot projects assisted by USAID and modeled on 
such initiatives in the US.  With the passage of the National Electrification Act in 1969, ECs were 
designated the country‘s primary electricity distribution system, and the sector expanded rapidly 
in  the  1970s  with  cooperatives  covering  all  areas  of  the  country  with  the  exception  of 
metropolitan Manila and Cebu, and some of the more remote islands.  Presently (2010), the 119 
ECs in the Philippines account for approximately 57 percent of total connections and 24 percent 
of  total  energy  consumption.  The  majority  of  ECs  are  connected  to  the  grid  and  purchase 
electricity from the national transmission company.  Access has increased rapidly, and 97 percent 
of barangays and 78% of households now have electricity connections. 
 
The legal framework for rural electrification in the Philippines is set out in the Electric Power 
Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) 2001, the Presidential Decree No. 269, and the Presidential Decree 
No. 1645 (which makes amendments to Decree 269).  EPIRA stipulates that ECs can be either 
non-stock, non-profit cooperatives and be governed under PD 269; stock cooperatives and be 
governed  under  the  Cooperative  Code;  or  stock  corporations  and  be  governed  under  the 
Corporation Code.  The vast majority of ECs —112 out of 119 as of 2008 — are non-stock and 
non-profit, owned by member consumers, and under the domain of PD 269.  These ECs are under 
the  domain  of  the  National  Electrification  Administration  (NEA)  and  while  NEA  is  not  a 
regulator in the strict sense of the word, it is tasked with providing financial and technical support 
to the ECs, and monitoring their performance.  These non-stock ECs will be the focus of this 
paper.   
 
ECs are owned by their members/consumers on payment of a nominal fee, with the members 
electing a board of directors who are responsible for the overall policy setting of the organization.  
The mode of elections is specified in guidelines issued by NEA.  The board, which numbers 
between 5 and 15 depending on the size of the EC, is elected on the basis of one-member one 
vote, with a once consecutive renewable term of three years, and with a third of the board up for 
election each year.  The geographical area of the cooperative is demarcated into districts which 
usually encapsulate one or more municipalities, with each director representing a district.  Aside 
from citizenship and membership of the cooperative, the only major restriction on eligibility for 
standing for the board elections is that the candidate cannot be holding any elective government 
office except that of barangay captain.  
 
The board, which among themselves selects a president, vice president, secretary, and treasurer, is 
de jure responsible for managing the overall business of the EC, and can adopt the necessary by-
laws  for  this  purpose.    It  is  meant  to  be  a  policy-making  body,  with  actual  day-to-day 
management the responsibility of a general manager.  The board is required to hold an annual 
general members meeting, with a quorum being 5% of members or a 100 whichever is less, and 
any additional members meetings as deemed necessary.  For example, major policy decisions, 
such as the consolidation of two or more cooperatives, or a merger, need a two-thirds approval of 
the members of each of the concerned cooperatives.  Similarly, the conversion of the EC into a 
                                                 
1 The description of the sector is based on data available circa 2008-09. 5 
 
stock cooperative or a stock corporation requires the two-thirds ratification of members in a 
general members meeting.             
 
While the management of the EC is ostensibly accountable to the board, NEA, with its overall 
mandate to promote electrification under PD269 and in particular under the so-called ‗martial 
powers‘  introduced  under  PD1645,  also  exercises  considerable  technical,  financial,  and 
regulatory authority.  Its powers include the technical and financial oversight of cooperatives, 
including the option of taking over management in extreme cases, administration of subsidies 
from the congressional appropriation for line expansion, guarantees to the cooperatives for power 
purchase from the electricity spot market, and administration of performance improvement plans.  
NEA  is  responsible  for  the  overall  performance  monitoring  of  cooperatives  and  has  a 
performance ranking system that includes measures on amortization, reductions in system losses, 
efforts at electrification, payments of generation and transmission charges, collection efficiency, 
and corporate governance.  For ECs that score low, NEA has the power to appoint an acting 
general manager and/or a project supervisor, a decision which cannot be challenged by the board 
of directors, an authority that NEA has exercised a number of times.   
 
NEA‘s de jure administrative powers are aimed at curtailing the board of directors‘ influence on 
the day-to-day management of the EC.  While the general manager of the EC does report to the 
board, his or her selection, appointment, and termination are governed by regulations issued by 
NEA that provide significant limitations on the board.  These regulations are explicitly aimed at 
limiting political influence in personnel management by protecting the general manager from 
these pressures and ensuring transparent and merit-based recruitment. 
 
NEA  is  not  an  independent  regulator  but  an  agency  under  the  Department  of  Energyand  is 
governed by a Board of Administrators, made up of a chairman and four members, one of whom 
is  the  Administrator,  with  the  chairman  and  members  appointed  by  the  president  of  the 
Philippines to serve a term of six years.  These institutional arrangements make NEA potentially 
susceptible to political influence.   For example, the president could always compel the NEA 
board to take specific actions he/she desires.  The exact channels by which this influence is 
exercised are not entirely clear, but it appears that the interests of congressmen and the governor 
do play an important role in its decision on whether to intervene in a particular cooperative, as 
some of the case studies below show.
2  In some cases it appears that NEA chose not to protect 
general managers from overly intrusive boards because of the board‘s political connections, and 
in other cases incompetent and malleable general managers were brought in from outside. 
   
Tariff policy is under the purview of the Electricity Regulatory Commission (ERC)  — to be 
precise, the ECs submit their tariff petitions first to NEA for approval before sending them to the 
ERC.    The  tariff-setting  methodology  allows  the  ECs  to  recover  their  cash  requirements  for 
power purchase costs, non-power costs (operations and maintenance, administration, and other 
general expenses), loan amortization and interest payments, reinvestment (5% of total revenues), 
and system losses up to a cap.  This cap has been steadily reduced over the years and is currently 
at 14%.  As these are non-profit organizations, the tariff methodology does not allow for any 
retention of savings beyond the cap, and any additional loss reduction is required to be passed on 
to consumers in the form of lower tariffs.  In addition to tariff setting, the ERC approval is also 
required for planned capital expenditures in excess of P500,000. 
                                                 
2 One common tactic used by the members of congress in the Philippines to exert influence over a 
particular government agency is to use the annual budget authorization process to ―extort‖ concessions.  An 
imaginable scenario is one where a particular member of congress withholds approval of the proposed 
budget until the NEA leadership agrees to provide assistance to the EC in his constituency.   6 
 
 
The diversity in performance of the ECs is the defining feature of the sector.  Overall system 
losses of cooperatives have declined significantly over the past twenty years, from a national 
average of 25 percent in 1987 to 13.5 percent in 2008 (Figure 1, left panel) although the pace of 
improvement has slowed down of late.  The variation around this national average is, however, 
considerable (Figure 1, right panel), with systems losses varying from a low of less than 7 percent 
for cooperatives such as Cebu III, Misamis Oriental I, and Bohol I and a high of over 23 percent 
for Laguna, Camarines Sur I, and Camarines Sur III.  Eighteen cooperatives have losses under 10 
percent while twelve have losses exceeding 18 percent.  Other performance indicators, such as 
operating margin, repayment to NEA, and collection efficiency, paint a similar picture of great 
divergence around a generally improving overall national average.   
 
 
In  terms  of  institutional  indicators,  overstaffing  in  cooperatives,  a  major  feature  of  high 
administrative costs, has been reduced, with the consumer-to-employee ratio declining from 211 
in 1998 to 350 in 2008, but remain high as ideally these ratios should be of the order of 400:1 for 
a dispersed rural island population and 600:1 for a compact urban population.  As Figure 2, left 
panel shows, this ratio varies from 745 for Davao Sur to a low of 112 for Camiguin, with eight 
cooperatives with ratios of 200 or lower.  Collection efficiency similarly varies greatly around the 
national average of 88%, a number that has remained stagnant over the past twenty years.  That 
overstaffing has an effect on systems losses is suggested in figure 2, bottom panel, which shows a 
negative relationship between these losses and the consumer-to-employee ratio.  
 
There are geographic and technical factors, in addition to politicization, behind this variation.  
The political imperative of electrification, which will be discussed in more detail below, meant 
that the cooperatives network was expanded to connect remote and scattered households that 
were commercially nonviable.  Approximately 90 percent of the 7.8 million customers of the ECs 
are households, which accounts for the relatively low share in energy consumption, and also the 
relatively greater difficulty, compared to Meralco, a private utility that serves Metro Manila, for 
example, in improving collection efficiency.  As per the Bank‘s previous sector policy note, 
roughly a third of the ECs are in non-viable franchise areas, either due to geographical factors 
such  as  susceptibility  to  natural  calamities  like  typhoons  or  location  in  small  islands  or 
mountainous regions, or have a small, predominantly residential consumer base.   
 
The World  Bank‘s  2000 study  identified  political  factors  as the  predominant  reason for  this 
diversity in performance in the economically more viable ECs.  A number of the high performing 
ECs are characterized by professional management that has taken major initiatives to reduce 
Figure 1:  System losses over time and across cooperatives 
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systems losses, made efforts to improve customer service while strictly penalizing customers who 
steal electricity and don‘t pay their bills.  They have also made progress in streamlining their 
organizations  by  removing  redundant  staff,  and  introduced  transparency  in  recruitment.    By 
contrast, many of the poorly performing ECs are characterized by high management turnover, 
excessive  involvement  of  the  Board  of  Directors  and  of  municipal,  provincial,  and  national 
political  actors  in  the  day-to-day  functioning  of  the  EC,  serious  procurement  irregularities, 
patronage-based employment, and high non-technical systems losses due to theft, often due to the 
collusion of employees and customers.      
 
To  put  it  another  way,  the  ECs‘  performances  appear  to  correlate  with  the  extent  to  which 
professional  managers  are  granted  sufficient  autonomy  to  run  them  on  technical,  managerial 
grounds.  The general managers‘ autonomy in turn is primarily a function of the extent of day-to-
day interference by the board members.  The boards‘ ability to dictate the ECs‘ management in 
turn  depends  on  the  level  of  autonomy  they  themselves  enjoy  from  other  local  or  national 
politicians.    In  short,  given  the  highly  localized  nature  of  the  ECs,  the  variable  patterns  of 
politicization  that  surrounds  them  unfold  within  a  nested  structure  of  state  capture  that  is 
particular to each locality.  We will elaborate on this structure below. 
 
Figure 2:  Key institutional indicators of electricity cooperatives (2008)  





3. The Philippines Political Context: A Review of the Relevant Literature 
 
State capture is a common theme of the Philippine political economy.  According to a widely 
accepted perspective, the state operates at the mercy of economic elites (e.g., landed oligarchs) 
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Coronel 2004).  On the other hand, a revisionist perspective has shown that many elites have 
acquired wealth and power after they captured access to public resources, for example, through 
winning elected posts and/or allying with influential national politicians (Sidel 1998).  Either as a 
consequence  or  a  cause of  elite dominance,  state  capture  emerges  as a  main  culprit of poor 
governance and development constraint in any narrative on the Philippine political economy.  
State  capture  is  pervasive  in  the  Philippine  politics  because  public  resources  offer  attractive 
sources of rents for power-holders and power-seekers and because there are not sufficient checks 
on their opportunistic behavior. 
 
There is also a broad agreement that in the Philippine politics is intensely local, and this has to do 
with the dominant mode of political organization in the country, apart from the geography and 
history  which  for  years  has  reinforced  the  natural  spatial  and  cultural  fragmentation  of  the 
Philippine society.  One of the key institutional characteristics of the Philippine democracy is the 
absence of a well-institutionalized political party with nation-wide presence.  Instead of political 
parties, a family (sometimes including extended kinship, friendship, and other informal personal 
ties) has become the primary unit of organization for political activities.  Since no single family 
can establish a nation-wide bailiwick, emergence of political clans is inexorably linked to specific 
localities and their political economies (McCoy 1994).  Anecdotes abound of political families in 
a  variety  of  localities  establishing  their  dominance  through  their  control  of  key  economic 
activities and access to political power.  When some of these families entrench themselves and 
manage to remain dominant in a particular area spanning generations, they become ―political 
dynasties‖, a term recognized (and derided) even in the Constitution.
3  How these families or 
clans establish political and economic dominance in a particular locality largely determines the 
nature of governance and a prospect and a pattern of socioeconomic development in this area.  
 
In a highly patronage-based political system such as the Philippines‘, control of wealth (or better 
yet a good part of the local economy) is an essential means to retain power and influence in a 
locality.    With  wealth,  local  political  clans  are  able  to  buy  votes  directly  to  win  elections, 
organize a local political machine to maintain captive voters, often with armed ―enforcers‖ to 
intimidate opposition and general voters into submission, and simply accumulate more wealth for 
personal enrichment and political power-building.  Capturing public apparatuses and using their 
political power and influence to consolidate their hold on local economic activities are among the 
most common means for wealth accumulation among Filipino political elites. 
 
As important as the local dimensions of politics in the Philippines, local politics does not exist 
and unfold in isolation from the national politics (and vice versa).  local politicians‘ varying 
positions within, and relations with, politicians at higher tiers of the political system are among 
the variables that determine the nature of local political economy.  On the one hand, the president 
(and presidential aspirants) relies heavily on local politicians to mobilize votes for them because 
of the absence of party machinery.  On the other hand, many elected local politicians rely on the 
national governments‘ fiscal largesse to supplement their generally scarce fiscal resources.
4  local 
politicians can also benefit from preferential regulatory treatments (e.g., on matters related to land 
use) and other political favors if they are in good terms with the president who also enjoys vast 
                                                 
3 Article II on Declaration of Principles and State Policies Principles, Section 26 states ―The State shall 
guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined 
by law.‖ 
4 The Philippine Constitution grants the president with a broad range of budgetary powers and discretion 
which he/she can, and does, use for the purpose of political alliance making with both members of the 
House of Representatives who represent particular geographic areas (districts) and local chief executives 
governing provinces, cities and municipalities.   9 
 
appointive powers to control the national bureaucracy.  In addition, local politicians can tap fiscal 
and regulatory protection of the national government through Congress, often having one of their 
own family members elected in the national legislature as part of their strategy to secure flow of 
national funds to their districts and thus solidify their control over local public affairs.  Hence 
gaining and maintaining access to the vast resources of the national government is an essential 
tool of political survival for most local politicians in the Philippines. 
 
Despite the pervasiveness of the political dynasties and their ―elective affinity‖ with state capture 
and the central importance of local politics, the existing literature does not provide a satisfactory 
explanation of the variations in the extent and the nature of state capture across different local 
jurisdictions.  It is these variations, however, that are critical for understanding different degrees 
and patterns of rent-seeking observed at the local level, such as the case of the 119 electricity 
cooperatives,  and  the  literature  is  largely  silent  on  this  critical  question:  What  are  the  key 
characteristics of local political economies that account for the observed variations in the extent 
of state capture and rent-seeking at the local level?   
 
As an exception, de Dios (2007) offers an insightful interpretation of the interactions between the 
economic endowments of a particular locality and the likely pattern of its political and economic 
development.    In  summarizing  his  argument,  de  Dios  (2007,  154)  presents  the  following 
schematic depiction of variation in local political economies: 
1.  Hobbesian  situations  where  contending  political  clans  vie  for  power  with  inconclusive  or 
impermanent results will be associated with the worst development outcomes. The absence of order 
discourages both investment and productive activity owing to the insecurity of property rights; even 
contending clans  themselves  can ensure their own economic interests only to the extent of their 
capabilities for violence. 
2. The emergence of a politically dominant clan or strongman is a step forward in terms of attaining 
order,  regardless  of  whether  this  takes  the  form  of  clientism  or  warlordism.  Where  political 
hegemony is combined with overweening economic dominance, however, the problem of credible 
commitment affects potential external investors, who fear possible expropriation or harassment; such 
areas will manifest significant investments directly undertaken by or in close association with the 
dominant clan itself. 
3. Where stable political conditions are guaranteed under a hegemonic political clan but the latter does 
not play an overweening local economic role, greater room is left for external investors to assume a 
larger role in the local economy. A minimal signal of commitment to an investment-friendly regime 
is  needed,  however,  and  this  notably  takes  the  form  of  investment  in  social  infrastructure  and 
maintenance of peace and order. Such conditions are attainable even under secular bosses and fiscal 
brokers.  
4. Without such a commitment and effort, the likely result is a regime of petty bosses thriving on 
parasitic and illegal activities while the local economy stagnates (as seen in some small towns and 
provinces in Southern Tagalog, for example). 
5. The stability of investment-friendly policies is enhanced most when political power becomes less 
based on the charisma or personal reputation of the local leaders and instead relies more on a civic 
constituency with a pronounced stake in the provision of local public goods. The few suggestive 
examples indicate that the class composition of this constituency is less important than the fact that it 
should be sizeable and influential (though not necessarily the majority population) and conscious of 
its interests beyond the persona of individual politicians. Depending on the locality‘s social structure, 
this constituency may emerge from a relatively affluent commercial class (Cebu City), middle-class 
residents and small businesses (Marikina City) or the marginalized sectors themselves, participating 
in  governance  through  people‘s  organizations  (Naga  City).  It  is  also  at  this  point  that  personal 




Although de Dios‘ analysis focuses on the effects of the nature of the local political economy on 
investor incentives and the consequent impacts on the area‘s economic development, similar logic 
applies, at least partially, to the relations between the nature of the local political economy and 
the local political elite‘s incentive to provide public services, such as universal access to quality 
electricity  distribution.  On  the  one  hand,  to  the  extent  that  the  maintenance  of  power  in  a 
particular locality depends on catering to broad segments of the constituencies, the politicians will 
have  a  stronger  incentive  to  ensure  the  EC  operates  efficiently  (e.g.,  with  limited  service 
interruption) and economically (e.g., without having to raise tariff too high).  The politician, 
however, will balance this incentive to cater to the interest of the general population with a 
counter-incentive to channel benefits to particular constituents or accumulate rents.  Appealing to 
particular  constituents  at  the  cost  of  the  general  public  can  be  politically  functional  if  the 
imperfections  inherent  in  the  electoral  system  limit  the  general  voters‘  ability  to  punish 
recalcitrant politicians and if those particular constituents are in a position to offer the politician 
disproportionate benefits in terms of votes, financing or other desirable goods.  The politician 
needs  rents  for  a  variety  of  purposes  including  financing  of  his  own  campaign  and  related 
political activities, dispensing political favors to allies and supporters and enriching himself and 
his families for pure personal gain.  Finally, this stylized politician does not exist in a vacuum.  
He operates within his own network of political allies and enemies, including in the particularity 
of the center-local relations discussed above.  His degree of freedom in either protecting the EC‘s 
managerial autonomy or raiding it for rent-seeking purposes is conditioned by the disposition of 
other political actors who may also approach the same EC with their own motives.    The next 
section elaborates on our framework for accounting for variations in patterns of capture across the 
case study ECs. 
 
4. The Political Economy of Nested Capture: A Framework 
 
This section presents a framework for explaining why some ECs are used by political actors for 
serving their private interests while others are not and are reasonably effective in providing this 
vital  public  good.    The  framework  is  based  on  the  interests  of  two  sets  of  actors:  (i)  local 
politicians, which are defined as those politicians whose electoral jurisdiction is within an EC‘s 
catchment area; and (ii) national politicians, defined as those whose electoral jurisdiction is larger 
than the EC‘s catchment area or, in other words, more than one EC catchment area is within their 
electoral jurisdiction.  Defined in this way, municipal mayors and congressmen will usually be 




Our argument is that the variations in the levels of politicization of the EC are related to the 
varying  nature  of  political  incentives  and  nested  political  relations  between  the  EC,  local 
politicians, and national politicians.  Local and national politicians will impact the EC through 
actors within the EC, namely the board of directors and the general manager.  In particular since 
the board of directors are elected, their political incentives also need to be understood.  Therefore, 
the incentives of the three sets of actors are elaborated below. 
 
The Incentives of the Board of Directors 
 
Given the institutional structure of ECs as elected bodies, we hypothesize that the ‗average‘ board 
of  directors  will  be  politicized.    One  would  expect  board  elections  to  be  similar  to  local 
government  elections  in  the  Philippines,  albeit  on  a  smaller  scale,  with  local  power  brokers 
playing an important role, and with active canvassing by mayors and congressmen on behalf of 
                                                 
5 The few exceptions include Albay and Palawan which have only one EC in the entire province. 11 
 
their candidates.
6  In particular, one would expect the economics of elections wo uld incentivize 
boards to use their authority for rent-seeking.  While board elections are smaller in scale than 
local government elections, and usually less competitive (voter turnout figures of 20% or less 
were commonly quoted), anecdotal evidence suggests that candidates spend on average between 
five hundred thousand and one million pesos in these campaigns.  These include th e standard 
expenditures on, for example, transporting cooperative members (i.e.,  consumers) to the voting 
booths, as well as vote buying, with a commonly quoted figure of 200 pesos per vote.   The fact 
that voter turnout in board elections is significantly less than that in municipal elections implies 
that these elections are more susceptible to manipulation as there are fewer votes to buy to 
determine an outcome.   
 
Given the importance of key individuals to deliver votes, the informal contract between a bo ard 
member and these individuals would involve the delivery of votes in exchange for the rents that 
the EC can provide.  These rents can include lucrative suppliers contracts to politically influential 
individuals  with associated kick-back schemes; recruitment of staff, particularly low -skilled 
casual employees, sometimes ahead of board elections; and intervention on behalf of consumers 
to forgive penalties for non-payment of bills, or to prevent disconnection.   
 
Some board members may use the EC board as  a ―stepping stone‖ for other elected posts (e.g., 
municipal council) for which the entry barrier for electoral contests is higher (and elections more 
expensive).  These members are expected to use their positions on the board to both build positive 
reputation  among  the  local  constitudents  and  by  building  strengthening  their  campaign  ―war 
chest.‖  Given that an ordinary voter/consumer is not in a position to see direct contribution of an 
individual board member on the EC‘s performance, the reputation building by a board member is 
more likely to take the form of addressing specific needs and demands of individual constituents 
such as a request for deferring bill payments or for employment.  From the cases examined for 
this paper, the frequency of EC board members aspiring for higher elected posts appears to be 
low. 
 
Given the political process by which board members are elected, we expect each EC to have a 
baseline value of ―a certain degree of politicization.‖  This stems from the electoral incentives of 
the board of directors combined with weak bottom-up accountability due to imperfections in EC 
board elections.  We a priori expect this to be the norm across all cooperatives.  Furthermore, the 
reality of local elections in the Philippines where local clans, as opposed to nationally-organized 
political  parties,  operate  as  the  key  organizational  unit  for  political  activities  means  that  a 
candidate for an EC board is unlikely to succeed electorally without support of one of the local 
clans.  Typically, a single board member represents one of the several local governments in the 
catchment area.  Hence obtaining endorsement of the mayor of that local government, or an 
alternative local political force, is crucial for his/her electoral success.  This makes most board 
members effectively dependent on mayors or other influential political groups in the locality.       
 
The Incentives of Local Politicians 
 
Local politicians have the choice of either intervening in the functioning of the EC to gain access 
to EC rents to finance their own political campaigns and to aid in political alliance building (as 
alliances are built and maintained on the basis of exchanges of favors) or to address EC-wide 
performance  issues  that  appeal  to  voters.    The  former  would  include  brokering  employment 
                                                 
6 For an analysis of flaws in the Philippines‘ national elections, see ―CEPPS Philippines Election 
Observation Program, Strengthening Electoral Process, IFES Final Report.‖  International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems, August 2004. 12 
 
opportunities for those who seek patronage jobs and rent-seeking in procurement and contracting. 
The latter includes the following: (i) to keep the tariff low if politicians fear that constituents‘ 
complaints about the tariff level may somehow affect their political fortune (and this will require 
that the EC operate at some level of efficiency since the tariff level is capped by the national 
regulator); (ii) to extend electricity lines to areas still without access;  (iii) to address service 
problems that their constituents may bring to their attention; or (iv) to intervene forcefully to seek 
more permanent solutions if the performance failure is severe and general across the jurisdiction.   
 
We posit that the motivations for rent-seeking will be higher than the concerns about the EC-wide 
performance issues as the latter approximate the incentive to provide public goods which are 
typically scarce in a political context dominated by patronage and clientelism.  Given the typical 
EC‘s board structure where a mayor has influence over just one or only a few of several (or as 
many as a dozen) districts, and given that the politician‘s electoral jurisdiction lies within the EC 
catchment area, few local politicians have either the incentives or authorities to address EC-wide 
performance issues.     
 
However, since interfering in the EC‘s management for the purposes of rent-seeking involves 
costs in terms of lower production due to poor electricity supply, local political actors will choose 
to intervene only when the ―returns‖ are judged to be ―worth the effort.‖  We argue that the 
returns are determined by two factors: (i) the rent-seeking potential of the EC — the bigger the 
EC in the local economic context the bigger the available rents and the greater the incentive of 
local politicians to intervene to capture it; and (ii) the competitiveness of local politics — the 
more competitive the local elections, and the more intense the political contest between rival 
clans, the higher the marginal value of the EC as a source of additional rents to swing an election. 
 
Relative potential of an EC as a source of rent 
 
Our hypothesis is that local politicians will not interfere in ECs unless these provide sufficiently 
large rents that warrant the transaction costs involved in such interference.  The local politicians‘ 
incentive to interfere is likely to be higher for those ECs which provide a relatively larger source 
of rent compared to other rent-seeking opportunities in the locality.  The larger the EC relative to 
the size of the local economy (including the size of the fiscal activities of the local governments), 
other  things  being  equal,  the  more  the  rent-seeking  opportunities,  the  greater  the  outside 
interference, and the greater the degree of politicization above the baseline value.  Cooperatives 
in economically more developed environments are likely to be relatively small players in terms of 
the rent seeking opportunities given alternatives as compared to relatively larger cooperatives in 
more agrarian settings.
7  Similarly, in localities where significant illegal economic activities exist, 
politicians in search of rents may find it more lucrative to control these informal economies than 
capture the EC.  Apart from small local economies,  controlling ECs in calamity-prone areas is 
particularly attractive to politicians as i) calamities create ample opportunities for political 
visibility,  ii)  the  ECs‘  access  to  national  relief  funds  provides  resources  for  rents,  and  iii) 
rehabilitation efforts can be skewed towards the politicians‘ constituencies.    
 
The capturing of the EC by local politicians is done through proxies, either the GM or Board 
members.    How  the  capturing  takes  place  in  turn  is  a  function  of  the  nature  of  political 
competition across municipal jurisdictions given that no municipal mayor has the ability to select 
                                                 
7 Typical methods of rent-seeking in the Philippines include preferential access to public works projects 
through companies owned or controlled by ―local‖ politicians, and these opportunities are expected to be 
greater in localities with relatively larger economies. 13 
 
(informally)  all  the  candidates  for  EC  Board  members  who  represent  different  geographic 
districts.   
 
Competition, visibility, and the types of banditry  
 
A  second  factor  impacting  the  incentives  of  local  politicians  is  the  intensity  of  political 
competition in the locality.  The higher the intensity of political competition, the greater the 
incentives of politicians to seek additional rents from capturing the EC (as well as any other 
source of rent) to gain a marginal edge over their political rivals.  This intensity of competition is 
intrinsically linked to the nature of the clan divisions in the area, given the primacy of the clan in 
Philippine politics.  In areas where there are rival and equally powerful clans, then political 
competition and the battle for economic rents are likely to be intense and hence the higher the 
temptation to involve the EC (as well as many other sources of rents) in these battles.  When 
these battles play out in the EC, they may translate into severe factionalism or frequent changes in 
the composition of the board and the constant changes in GMs, hence undermining the EC‘s 
operational performance.   
 
In areas where there is a dominant clan, in contrast, the incentives for interventions in the EC‘s 
internal affairs are, other things being equal, likely to be less because, by definition, the dominant 
clans in those areas are more electorally secure and also are likely to hold dominant economic 
positions within the localities.  In these cases, the degrees of rent-seeking through the EC may not 
be much beyond the baseline value.  On the other hand, an EC with a relatively large source of 
rents in a politically stable area is likely to lead to its monopoly capture by the dominant local 
clan.  In these cases, the dominant clan is expected to act like a ―stationary bandit‖ whose interest 
is in continuing with some level of rent-seeking while preserving the EC as a long-term source of 
rent (Olson 1993).   
 
The Incentives of National Politicians 
 
National politicians in our framework refer to provincial governors, the president and possibly 
national senators.  We argue that since national politicians‘ electoral jurisdictions are larger than 
the  EC  catchment  area  they  have  less  of  an  incentive  to  interfere  in  EC  operations  for  the 
purposes of rent-seeking.  By the same token, their incentive to interfere in EC operations at all is 
likely to be limited under normal circumstances.  However, once they choose to intervene, they 
are more likely to be motivated to address EC performance issues or to come in aid of their local 
allies.  The EC is a relatively small source of rents for the national politician; however, EC-wide 
performance failures can become a political liability for him.  A typical EC catchment area can 
contain something like a third of the provincial vote pool and there is a risk that at some point the 
blame for the EC‘s poor performance is placed on the governor.   
 
The likelihood that a higher-tier politician gets involved in an EC matter in turn depends on the 
political salience of the EC or the EC catchment area for his/her broader political calculation 
beyond the dynamics of the local politics.  The higher the salience, the greater the incentive to 
intervene.  The national politician will most likely work through NEA to intervene in the EC.  
This NEA intervention could be low-key and routine, as in NEA providing the regular checks to 
ensure that the EC complies with rules, knowing that it has the implicit backing of the national 
politician.  Or it could be more dramatic if EC performance failures become severe and NEA 
intervenes  and  impose  corrective  measures  through  its  considerable  de  jure  powers.    The 
framework implies that NEA‘s de fact authority — the extent to which it exercises its ‗martial 
powers‘ — is an outcome that is determined by the political interests of national politicians.  
Whether or not NEA‘s interventions will be successful depend on the relations and the balance of 14 
 
power between national politicians on the one hand and the local politicians who are behind an 
EC‘s politicization on the other.   
 
The Political Economy of Nested Capture 
 
To  summarize,  three  variables  determine  the  incentives  of  local  and  national  politicians  and 
therefore the level of politicization of an EC beyond the ―baseline level‖ expected of any average 
EC: the potential of an EC as a source of rent; the competitiveness of local politics, and the 
political salience of the EC catchment area.   How these three variables interact is depicted in 
Figure 3 below.  On the left half of the figure, if the EC is a low source of rent then it is unlikely 
to attract the interests of local politicians and the extent of politicization will be determined 
entirely by the EC board.  The degree of competitiveness of local politics will not be important as 
local politicians would not be interested in the EC‘s affairs, and therefore this variable has been 
excluded from the left half of Figure 3.  Given the economics of elections in the Philippines, we 
would  expect  some  degree  of  interference  by  the  board,  which,  if  unchecked  by  national 
politicians, will result in ―baseline politicization‖ of the EC.  This outcome is depicted in the 
extreme left branch of the figure.   
 
On the other hand, if the political salience of the EC catchment area is high and therefore the EC 
performance matters for the political fortune of the national politician (likely to be either the 
provincial governor or the national president), then a national politician will be motivated to 
encourage NEA to intervene in the EC to improve EC performance.  These efforts are likely to be 
successful since there are usually no local politicians who have a stake in the EC and who are 
powerful enough to resist this intervention.  We would therefore expect smaller EC‘s in areas 
with high political salience in general to have relatively low levels of politicization.   
 
The right half of the figure depicts the situation where the EC has high rent potential.  In this case 
local politicians will interfere, and the precise nature of this intervention will be conditioned by 
the intensity of local political competition.  In cases where local political competition is intense, 
local politicians will have considerable incentive to use the EC as a source of rent.  If the EC also 
happens to be in a catchment area that has low political salience for national politicians, then we 
will observe a high degree of EC politicization as there will be few external checks on local 
politicians.  These are likely to be the worst performing ECs.  In cases where the political salience 
is high, NEA may intervene, but this intervention is likely to be resisted by local politicians 
resulting in considerable conflict in the EC.  Whether or not these interventions are successful 
will depend on the balance of power between local and national politicians; NEA‘s interventions 
are  more likely  to  be successful  in  EC‘s  that are  located in  areas  with less intense  political 
competition and where the stakes are lower for local politicians. 
 
This  framework  implies  that  the  worst  performing  ECs  will  be  the  ones  with  (i)  high  rent 
potential, (ii) in areas with highly competitive local politics, and (iii) in areas with low national 
salience; and the best performing ones will be those with (i) low rent potential, and (ii) in areas 
with high national salience.   The other combinations should result in intermediate cases with 
medium levels of politicization.     
 
Two limitations of this framework need to be highlighted.  First, the framework says nothing 
about when an intervention by NEA with the backing of a national politician in EC‘s with high 
political  salience  will  take  place.    For  example,  the  performance  of  the  EC  may  have  to 
deteriorate considerably before the intervention occurs and improvements begin.    
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Second, there is one important actor that has not been explicitly included in the framework, 
namely the general manager (GM).  Our position is that it is only when mayors or other local 
politicians  refrain  from  interfering  in  the  EC‘s  day-to-day  management  for  rent-seeking  or 
patronage purposes can the GM have sufficient space and autonomy to manage the EC on purely 
technical-managerial criteria.   However, a good GM can have an independent impact on the 
probability of politicization that is not captured in our framework.  As some of the case studies 
highlight  if,  due  to  accidents  of  history,  a  good  manager  is  able  to  build  a  reputation  then 
politicians are less likely to interfere in the EC for fear of a backlash.   The risk of such negative 
popular reactions is higher in those ECs which have performed relatively well.  In contrast, the 
potential political cost of interfering in an EC that is already poorly performing is not particularly 
high  because  the  consumers  are  already  ―used  to‖  such  a  situation  and  may  not  have  the 
information to attribute a marginal worsening of the EC‘s performance to the local politicians‘ 
additional interference.   
 
It follows that a part of the political economy of EC may be characterized by virtuous and vicious 
circles where well-performing ECs discourage political interference while poor performing ECs 
invite more of it, until the performance problem reaches a crisis proportion.  However, to the 
extent that whether or not an EC gets a good manager is random, this factor is not included in the 
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5.  The Case Studies 
 
The objective of the case studies is to illustrate the theoretical framework by examining some of 
the best performing and worst performing ECs in the Philippines.  These cases were deliberately 
selected on the variables of interest; therefore, by definition, they do not serve as an empirical test 
of the framework.  Rather, the aim of the analysis is to bring out the interests of the actors 
involved and to provide some flesh to the preceding abstract theoretical discussion.  The selected 
cases are four poorly performing ECs, namely Albay Electric Cooperative (ALECO), Pampanga 
Electric Cooperative (PELCO) II, Central Negros Electric Cooperative (CENECO), and Sorsogon 
Electric  Cooperative  (SORECO)  II;  and  two  well-performing  ECs,  namely  Palawan  Electric 
Cooperative (PALECO), and Cebu Electric Cooperative (CEBECO) III.  In order to exclude 
geographic factors, all of these ECs are in viable franchise areas.  
 
Table 1 provides some basic data on these six cases.  The poor performing ECs are in general 
characterized by high systems losses, high financial losses, dependence on subsidies from the 
national  budget,  and  overstaffing;  the  good  performing  ones  have  low  systems  losses,  high 
collection  efficiency,  and  generally  good  financial  performance.  The  discussion  below 
summarizes the cases along the variables of interest, namely the extent to which the level of 
politicization is driven by the hypothesized impact of rent-seeking potential, the competitiveness 
of local politics, and the political salience of the EC catchment area.   
 
Table 1: Basic data on the Cases (2008)  
  CENECO  ALECO  PELCO II  SORECO II  PALECO  CEBECO 
III 
Consumers  138,544  162,924  129,492  74,050  74,125  60,890 
MWH sold  505,079  203,873  241,477  48,167  112,266  133,660 
Systems loss  11.36%  24.8%  18.1%  20.82%  11.3%  5.2% 
Consumer/employee  381  325  187  182  372  383 
Operating revenue 
(000s) 
2,455,496  1,320,320  1,379,865  386,416  924,623  516,440 
Net margin (loss) 
(000s) 




CENECO in the province of Negros Occidental is the second largest EC in the Philippines in 
terms of power sold.  While its systems losses at 11.4% are better than the national average, it can 
be categorized as a poor performer given its consistently high financial losses despite a favorable 
and compact franchise area that includes the city of Bacolod with several large industries, and 
with commercial and industrial customers accounting for half of power sold (which makes it 
easier for the EC to collect tariff payments).     
 
CENECO is characterized by a number of governance failures.  A high proportion of the systems 
losses are non-technical, again due to pilferage and collusion, and reflective of the patronage-
based hiring of employees.  Numerous instances of procurement irregularities were cited by the 
interviewees, including the award of a contract for the supply of a transformer to the 3rd lowest 
bidder  (resulting  in  overpayment  of  P30million)  and  against  the  recommendations  of  the 
procurement committee.  When the lowest bidder filed a complaint, the Board simply decided to 
procure  another  transformer,  even  though  it  was  not  needed.    This  then  triggered  NEA‘s 
intervention to remove a member of the Board and the general manager.   
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NEA‘s  interventions  however,  have  not  been  successful  as  evidenced  by  a  high  turnover  of 
general managers, with 6 in the past 10 years, and an additional two NEA appointed project 
supervisors.  Most recently, a NEA appointed general manager was forced out by the Board due 
to his investigation of procurement anomalies involving the over-invoicing of gasoline purchases.  
While we were not privy to all the facts, it appeared that NEA was unwilling or unable to protect 
this reformist general manager against the opposition of the Board, who ousted him in a split 4-3 
vote,  and  a  faction  of  the  local  politicians  who  apparently  stood  behind  the  Board.    In  this 
episode, opposition by the EC union to some of the efficiency-enhancement measures introduced 
by the ousted general manager might also have been a contributing factor.   
 
local politicians have been actively engaged in CENECO‘s affairs, which is unsurprising given 
the EC‘s large size and high rent seeking potential.  The politics of CENECO are dominated by 
the politics of Bacolod City.  Of CENECO‘s nine districts, five are located within Bacolod City 
and the remaining four distributed among three other cities each having one board member as its 
representative and two municipalities which share one member on the board.
10  Although the 
―normal‖ politics of the Board is definitely an element of the governance failures in CENECO, a 
more important factor is the nature of the politics in and around Bocolod City, including the 
fallout from the intense rivalry between the congressman and the city mayor.  The two belong to 
opposing clans whose rivalry has a long history, and is symptomatic of the generally intense 
political competition in the province.  The congressman was in his last term and was allegedly 
eyeing to run for the city mayor‘s office in the 2010 election whereas the mayor was still in his 
second term and is eligible for one more re-election.
11 The Board is deeply divided between 
supporters of the congressman and supporters of the mayor.  The most visible aspect of this 
conflict has been the recent cutoff of power of the cit y hall for non-payment of bills and the 
retaliatory closure of the CENECO offices by the city for non-payment of taxes. 
 
To summarize therefore, this paper‘s theoretical framework would predict that CENECO would 
be one of the worst performing ECs given its large size and therefore high rent-seeking potential, 
the intensity of the local political competition in Bacolod city, and the lack of any particular 
significance  of  the  EC‘s  catchment  area  for  national  politicians,  which  may  explain  NEA‘s 




ALECO is one of the largest and worst performing ECs in the Philippines, with systems losses 
that increased from 21.2% to 24.8%, and collection efficiency that decreased from 94% to 78%, 
between 2003 and 2007.  It is one of the three ECs in Philippines that was under close monitoring 
by NEA at the time the research was conducted (the other two being PELCO II and PELCO III).  
Its sustained financial losses resulted in indebtedness to the National Power Corporation (NPC) of 
P1.5 billion, and to NEA of P0.5 billion, repeated threats of power disconnection by NPC, and 
finally  a  nationally  brokered  management  takeover  by  the  NPC  in  2008.  It  is  therefore,  in 
contrast to CENECO, an example of poor performing EC in which NEA eventually successfully 
intervened.   
 
                                                 
10 This contrasts with the situation in CASURECO II, for example, where Naga City accounts for 30-40% 
of the consumption in the EC‘s catchment area and yet have only two of the 12-member board seats. 
11 As in many other localities, the politics of Bacolod appears to be intensely personal as well.  The mayor 
also told us of personal rivalry between him and the congressman dating back to the 1980s when he first 
ran for an elected office and defeated the congressman. 19 
 
ALECO shares many of CENECO‘s governance problems.  First, its electricity tariff is too low to 
cover costs even if systems losses are reduced and collection efficiency improved, as the ALECO 
management never applied to the ERC for an increase in the tariff between 2003 and 2008, in 
large  part  due  to  the  Board‘s  fear  that  a  tariff  increase  would  have  negative  electoral 
ramifications.  Second, its collection efficiency is low because of sustained inaction against non-
paying  and  politically  protected  consumers,  most  notably  the  Barangay  Power  Associations 
(BAPAs)  which  are  major  delinquents  but  successfully  lobby  municipal  mayors  to intervene 
whenever ALECO issues them disconnection notices.  Third, the EC‘s high systems losses have a 
big  non-technical  component,  primarily  pilferage  (while  these  are  not  measured  separately, 
officials stated that they account for roughly 
half  of  the  losses),  which  in  turn  results 
from  collusion  between  consumers  and 
ALECO linemen.  Fourth, patronage-based 
employment has been a constant feature, in 
particular of contract staff whose six month 
terms  are  repeatedly  renewed  or  who  are 
regularized.  While ALECO‘s consumer-to-
employee  ratio  of  325  is  in  line  with  the 
national  average,  this  does  not  take  into 
account  staff  on  contract  —  who  are  not 
considered  employees  —  who  number 
about 100.  It is also interesting to note that 
there was a surge in employees prior to the 
board elections of 2007 and 2001 (Figure 4), 
again  indicative  of  this  phenomenon  of 
patronage.  Finally, and most significantly, are the alleged cases of procurement fraud that have 
been reported in the local press, such as over-invoicing for transformers,
12  and the delivery of 
equipment even before the bidding process  was completed, resulting in equipment that did not 
conform to the technical specifications. 
 
The EC has been characterized by considerable involvement of the governor and congressman in 
EC management.  ALECO scores very high on the variable ‗rent-seeking potential‘ as it is the 
only EC supplying the province of Albay, a regional center of the Bicol region with a population 
of  1.19  million.    ALECO‘s  catchment  area  covers  15  municipalities  and  3  cities.    Given 
ALECO‘s  province-wide  reach,  this  is  a  case  where  the  governor,  by  our  definition,  is  also 
considered a local politician.  The fact that Albay is also in a typhoon prone area and therefore a 
regular recipient of reconstruction and rehabilitation funding from the national government has 
also increased its rent-seeking potential and generated considerable political interest in its affairs 
by  the  governor,  congressmen,  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  mayors.    Under  the  Bicol  Calamity 
Assistance for Rehabilitation (CARE) funds the province received P770 million (out of a national 
allocation of P9 billion), of which P220 million were for the rehabilitation and/or replacement of 
dilapidated  electric  facilities  to  be  administered  by  NEA  and  the  provincial  government,  a 
considerable avenue for patronage and rent-seeking.  The governor, and to a lesser extent, the 
congressmen have also regularly intervened on behalf of ALECO every time the NPC threatened 
to cut power on account of ALECO‘s debts.    
 
ALECO, unlike CENECO, also scores highly on the variable, ‗salience of EC catchment area for 
national politicians‘.  As a regional center, Albay is a politically important province, as it has 
access to the means of transportation and communication crucial in election campaigns and in 
                                                 
12  The Bicol Chronicle, September 11, 2004 














vote counting, and is the locus of major government facilities and line agencies, and therefore the 
levers of resource distribution, which may affect electoral outcomes.  The province is also home 
to a highly influential advisor to former president Arroyo, and his interest in the EC was a major 




Like ALECO, PELCO II has been a sustained poor performer and is under close monitoring by 
NEA.  It is a large EC, and although its customer base is almost entirely residential, it is located 
in a compact, viable franchise area.  It has consistently had systems losses in the twenty percent 
range, has seen declining collection efficiency, a decreasing consumer-to-employee ratio, and has 
been incurring huge losses requiring subsidies from the national budget. 
 
The governance problems in PELCO II are similar to those of CENECO and ALECO: significant 
pilferage,  collusion  between  consumers  and  employees,  patronage  driven  overstaffing,  high 
management turnover (4 GMs in the past 5 years), and considerable procurement irregularities as 
noted for example in NEA audit reports.  The Board has been highly interventionist in the day-to-
day management of the EC, authorizing payments to the NPC for power purchase, payments to 
suppliers, and managing the staff payroll.  One interviewee stated that for the Board ―the bottom 
line is to make the EC a milking cow‖, and the Board‘s culpability in the above-mentioned 
governance  problems  was  widely  cited.    The  Board  is  also  factionalized  between  two  rival 
groupings, and there was a case of some of the board directors overstaying their tenures.  Inter-
clan rivalries have also strained the relationship between the Board and municipal politicians, as 
evidenced by the retaliatory actions taken between the EC and the Municipal Government of 
Mabalacat in 2004 involving PELCO II cutting the power supply of the municipal offices on non-
payment of bills, and the municipality responding with shutting down the EC offices for non-
payment of taxes. 
 
PELCO  II,  being  a  large  EC,  has  high  rent-seeking  potential.    Local  politics  is  also  highly 
competitive.  Therefore, it is not surprising that municipal mayors are involved to a considerable 
degree in the EC‘s affairs.  However, congressmen are surprisingly not involved, which may be 
explainable by the somewhat unique status of Pampanga as the home province of the former 
President of the Philippines, and therefore the considerable salience of the EC‘s catchment area to 
this national politician.   
 
The former President‘s interests were to showcase Pampanga as a prosperous province, which 
implied improving the services of the 4 ECs.  Given her national constituency, it would seem 
reasonable to suppose that this service delivery objective, in terms of cultivating votes, would 
dominate any rent-seeking motivations that the ECs could support, which are by definition small 
in the national context, and indeed her behavior suggests as much.  The President has been quite 
proactive in the province, with her interests apparently operationalized in the province by NEA, 
and with the strong support of the then presidential advisor on rural electrification who also 
played an important role in sustaining good performance CEBECO III (to be discussed below).  
As mentioned, in response to the long-standing problems in PELCO II NEA has intervened and 
brought in a project supervisor and a general manager to improve the performance of the EC.  
Both these individuals have roots in the former communist underground resistance of the Marcos 
era, and were chosen precisely because it was assumed that they would be able to withstand the 




In sum, PELCO II appears to be a case of an EC that was poor performing due to its high rent-
seeking potential and intensity of local competition; however, when Arroyo became president, 
NEA received the necessary backing from a national politician to intervene in the EC.  While 
NEA‘s interventions are strong, they do leave the Board with some options for retaliation, as 
exemplified in the removal of the previous NEA appointed general manager by the Board for 
alleged mismanagement and corruption.  It is also too early to tell whether the current reforms are 




SORECO II is one of the 7 ECs in the Philippines that are registered with the Cooperatives 
Development Authority (CDA), and the larger of the two ECs supplying power to Sorsogon 
province.  Given its status as a stock cooperative, it does not fall under NEA‘s jurisdiction, thus 
potentially depriving national politicians, if they so desire, a channel of influencing the EC.  It is a 
mid-sized cooperative with roughly 56,000 consumers, 64 percent of whom are residential with 
only 2 percent industrial customers; its rent-seeking potential, therefore, is low.  SORECO II is 
therefore, a good test of the hypothesis of baseline politicization that we would expect in ECs 
given the economics of elections in the Philippines.   
 
The bulk of SORECO  II‘s history since its formation in 1977 has been characterized  by an 
intense power struggle between some of the key stakeholders, namely the board of directors, the 
management, the employee union, and NEA.  The Board‘s decision to register with the CDA — 
in 1996 — was motivated in large part by the desire to control a powerful and long-serving 
General Manager who had generated a core following from a subset of the employees through the 
distribution of favors.  The registration with the CDA however, sparked management action and 
union counteraction that led to the creation of two boards of directors and two sets of managers in 
1998 resulted in organizational paralysis.  Over the past decade however, the board has been 
dominant in the EC‘s affairs.   
 
De jure, in CDA-registered ECs there are few checks and balances on the authority of the Board 
from NEA.  NEA can no longer invoke P.D. 269 and P.D. 1645 and hire or terminate general 
managers,  or  suspend  the  Board,  officers,  or  employees  of  the  EC.    NEA  however  retains 
financial  powers  requiring  that  any  application  for  loans  by  SORECO  II  require  prior  NEA 
approval.  The history of SORECO II in the past decade has been highlighted by the strained 
relations between the Board and management, with a high turnover of general managers (five in 
past seven years), and numerous cases of illegal dismissals of managers either pending in the 
court or resulting in compensatory payments to former general managers.  Anecdotal evidence 
also reveals that the Board has become involved in almost all facets of managerial decision-
making within the EC, in contravention to its role as only a policy-making body.  These including 
very micro operational decisions such as the purchase of tee-shirts for linemen, on a decision on 
whether or not the EC needs to buy a new car,  the transfer of employees from one office to 
another,  and,  most  significantly,  the  crowding  of  the  pre-qualification,  bidding  and  awards 
committee (PBAC) with the members of the Board.  The Board has also used its powers to 
increase its per diem allowances five-fold over the past two years. 
 
Its  small  size  and  limited  rent-seeking  potential  would  suggest  limited  involvement  of  local 
politicians in the day-to-day affairs of the EC, and this indeed is the case, in sharp contrast to 
ALECO, PELCO II, CENECO, and CASURECO II.  local politicians do have an interest in 
extending electrification to all the barangays, and under this pressure SORECO II has extended 
its lines to many non-viable areas.  They have also used Board elections as a means to test their 
political  machine  or  to  demonstrate  their  political  strength  by  way  of  preview  for  the  more 22 
 
important municipal elections.  However, this is short of the detailed interventions seen in the 
other cases.   
     
CEBECO III 
 
CEBECO III has consistently been the best performing EC in the Philippines, and the recipient of 
numerous awards and recognition from NEA.  It is a medium-sized cooperative, with residential, 
commercial,  and  industrial/large  load  consumers  making  up  50%,  25%,  and  11%  of  sales 
respectively.  At 5.2% for 2008, it has the lowest systems losses in the country, has maintained 
100% collection efficiency, and has been consistently returning a profit.  The other two ECs in 
the province, CEBECO I and CEBECO II, are also good performers with single digit systems 
losses, and there is a high level of coordination and cooperation among all three ECs.  Indeed, 
from a management and corporate governance perspective, as will be elaborated below, the three 
can be viewed as a single entity. 
 
CEBECO III‘s excellent technical and financial performance is matched by an equally impressive 
corporate culture.   There is a strong sense of service delivery in the EC with rapid response 
teams that are mobilized in the event of power breakdowns or other customer complaints, high 
staff morale and a strict work ethic.  Indiscipline and corruption are clearly not tolerated, and 
customers who do not pay their bills have their connection promptly cut off.  There is also 
apparent harmony between the management and the board, and no hint of the factional rivalries or 
the governance problems that are so evident in the poor performing ECs.  
 
The  key  ingredient  to  the  CEBECOs‘  success  is  the  dominant  role  played  by  a  politically 
powerful patron who has been intent to make these ECs a role model for the rest of the country.   
A former presidential adviser on rural electrification, and who hails from Cebu, effectively runs 
the three ECs and the corporate culture of these organizations is his creation.  It would not be an 
exaggeration to state that the staff of the ECs have a religious devotion to this presidential adviser 
, who has a high level of respect in Cebu as a priest.  All key decisions require his blessing, 
including commercial negotiations, large procurements, and the hiring of top-level management.   
 
Discussions with the business community and the mayor of Toledo city suggest that it is the 
combination of this presidential adviser‘s social and political influence plus his demonstrated 
ability as a good manager that has made the CEBECOs largely immune from negative external 
political interference.  This is not to say that such pressures are not exerted from time to time.  In 
the early 1990s, the factional rivalries between the mayor and vice mayor of Toledo city had an 
impact  on  the  CEBECO  III  board,  and  politicians  do  try  to  field  candidates  for  the  Board 
elections.  However, the fact that the EC is high performing combined with  the presidential 
adviser‘s considerable political influence serve as an effective deterrent against politicians.  For a 
politician to be exposed as meddling with the affairs of these well-performing ECs would be 
politically costly.  Instead it appears that other avenues of rent-seeking were being pursued, in 
particular around the environmental and labor regulations around the mining operations in the 
area and control of the water districts.       
 
This relative lack of involvement is also helped by the fact that the CEBECOs offer limited 
avenues for rent-seeking as compared to the alternatives, such as from the environmental and 
labor regulations around the mining operations in the area and control of the water districts.  Cebu 
Province also has a fairly diversified economy with the Chinese Filipinos, who are known for not 
getting directly involved in politics, dominating a lion's share (―70%‖) of the local economy.  The 
broader political culture of the province also appears to be less disruptive, as the intensity of 
competition between rival clans is less pronounced.   23 
 
 
Many interviewees believe that the good management of the CEBECOs has set off a virtuous 
circle  with  politicians  deterred  from  interfering  and  disrupting  management,  thus  risking  the 
wrath  of  the  media  and  voters,  and  this  lack  of  interference  in  turn  allowing  professional 
managers to prosper.  There was confidence that the CEBECOs would continue to perform well 
even  after  the  presidential  adviser‘s  departure  due  both  to  these  reputational  effects  and  the 




Palawan  Electric  Cooperative  (PALECO)  is  a  medium-sized  cooperative  that  is  the  sole 
distribution  utility  for  the  island  of  Palawan.    Its  customer  base  is  primarily  residential  and 
commercial,  and  although  the  overall  franchise  area  is  viable,  its  11%  systems  losses,  and 
consumer-to-employee  ratio  of  372,    indicate  reasonably  strong  management,  given  the 
challenges posed in supplying power to the more remote municipalities scattered over the area of 
the  island.    The  EC  had,  until  very  recently,  been  recovering  its  costs  (as  stated,  the  tariff 
methodology  does  not  allow  for  significant  profits),  and  steadily  improving  its  consumer-to-
employee  ratio.    In  August  2006  PALECO  registered  with  the  CDA  and  is  now  a  stock 
cooperative. 
 
On governance, PALECO also scores generally positively.  The current general manager has been 
in his position since 1994, and is one of the longest-serving managers in the country.  Under his 
leadership the EC has taken strong measures to reduce non-technical losses by disciplining staff 
caught colluding with customers and has gone after delinquent customers by cutting off their 
connections for non-payment of bills.  No significant procurement irregularities were brought to 
our attention in interviews with the local chamber of commerce.  In general the picture that 
emerged was of a general manager that dominated the proceedings of the EC, and a Board that 
was subservient to his authority, a surprising finding given the de jure authority that the Board 
has in CDA-registered cooperatives, as exemplified by the case of SORECO II. 
 
While some of PALECO‘s Board members come from political families, interviewees stated that 
the  Board  was  less  politicized  than  in  other  ECs.    Indeed  after  the  conversion  to  the  stock 
cooperative, the Board has continued to abide by the NEA guidelines on the selection of the 
general manager to ensure merit and transparency in the process.  The Board has also maintained 
the general manager‘s administrative authority over line departments, and does not overrule the 
decisions of the bids and awards committee on procurement decisions, again in sharp contrast to 
SORECO II. 
 
While a priori one would expect the rent-seeking potential of PALECO to be quite high given that 
it is the sole distribution utility for the island, it appeared that politicians‘ attention was more 
focused on the money to be made through illegal fishing.  One respondent stated that this could 
provide as much as P10-15 million of campaign funds, far larger than what PALECO could net.  
A number of interviewees also stated that politics in Palawan were less intense than in Bicol, for 
example, one reason perhaps being that Palawan is outside the typhoon belt and therefore is not a 
recipient of the calamity relief funds.  Nonetheless, the lack of interference in the EC is surprising 




 Summing up 
 
Figure 5: sums up how the cases conform to the theoretical framework set out in Section 4.  The 
sharpest distinctions suggested by our framework should be in the cases along branches (2) and 
(5) of the figure.  Our framework suggests, as backed up by the case study, that CENECO would 
be  highly  politicized as it  has  high  rent-seeking  potential,  is located  in  an  area  with intense 
political  competition,  but  lacks  national  salience  to  enable  a  successful  NEA  intervention.  
PELCO II, in the pre-Arroyo period, would also fit this profile.  This is indeed the case.  By 
contrast, CEBECO III would be expected to be the least politicized as the EC is a relatively small 
player in the local economic context — the licensing regime around mining in Toledo appears to 
be the focal point of political attention rather than the potential rents from the mid-sized EC — 
and has high political salience for a powerful national politician.
13   
 
ALECO and PELCO II (in the Arroyo period) are example of branch (6).  ALECO is a large EC 
in a typhoon-probe area with high rent-seeking potential; and the fact that it is also the only EC in 
a politically important province also gives it high salience for  national politicians.  ALECO is 
also interesting as it reveals that the interest of politicians in the EC only became prominent after 
the three original cooperatives were merged, thereby increasing its rent-seeking potential.  Indeed 
part of the motivation for the merger was precisely to inc rease the political usage of the EC.  
Therefore, our framework would suggest considerable intervention by local politicians but also a 
high likelihood of successful NEA intervention, predictions that are in general supported by the 
case study.    Given the current NEA intervention, we can code its level of politicization as 
‗medium‘.  
 
SORECO II is a case of baseline politicization as predicted by the framework.  It has elicited little 
interest from congressmen and mayors, despite the absence of NEA, because of its relatively 
small size, and therefore lower rent-seeking potential.  Instead, the board has been unchecked in 
its pursuit of rent-seeking.   
 
PALECO is the one EC that does not conform particularly well to the framework as given its 
large size one would expect relatively high rent-seeking potential which — coupled with its lack 
of national political salience and lack of protection from NEA  — given its status as a stock 
cooperative — would suggest higher politicization than is the actual case.  However, PALECO is 
a good example of how a strong general manager can build a reputation and deter politicians from 
interfering in the EC for fear of a backlash, a feature that was discussed in Section 4 but not 
included in the framework.   
 
                                                 
13 At least for the period when the field work was conducted, the mayor of Toledo was a relative of the 
provincial governor and as such, she may have needed less rent-seeking on her own as she could probably 
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Figure 5: The predicted location of the cases   
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Political Economy Profiling of ECs 
 
The political economy framework presented here can be used as a means for profiling ECs and 
for assessing the realism of technical reforms proposed for a particular EC.  It can be used to 
identify in which ECs the level of politicization is expected to be above or below the baseline 
value based on the three variables of interest.  In theory, all ECs can be ―scored‖ along these three 
variables, though, realistically, this scoring will require a fair amount of subjective assessment.  
This scoring can give an indication of where reforms are likely to work and where they are likely 
to fail, thus providing a much-needed complement to technical analyses. 
 
Reforms unlikely to work 
 
The risk profiling aside, the analysis does point to certain reforms and institutional arrangements 
that are unlikely to work in most circumstances.  These are as follows: 
 
Conversion to stock cooperatives 
 
Conversion of ECs to stock cooperatives is viewed by many reformers as a necessary interim step 
towards conversion to stock corporations.  However, this paper underlines the risks with this 
strategy.  In stock cooperatives registered with the CDA, only consumers/owners with an equity 
share  are  allowed  to  vote  in  Board  elections  or  in  the  annual  general  members  meetings.  
Importantly, each shareholder is allowed only one vote, irrespective of the size of their equity.  
For PALECO for example, this implied that the voting population has been reduced from 18,000 
to approximately 1200 after the conversion.  The positive aspect of this restriction is that the 
member voters who have contributed money are more likely to participate in elections and in 
annual meetings; the negative aspect is that it is less costly for politicians to capture elections as 
there are fewer voters to buy off and their identities are easily known.  In balance, one would not 
expect the conversion to stock cooperatives to change the fundamental institutional structure of 
ECs as elected bodies.   
 
Unlike non-stock cooperatives, stock cooperatives are not subjected to the checks and balances 
provided, at least in theory, by NEA, and therefore do not provide national politicians with a 
vehicle to intervene positively in the EC‘s affairs.  Therefore, we would, ceteris paribus, expect 
higher  levels  of  politicization  in  these  ECs.    The  example  of  SORECO  II  clearly  provides 
evidence to this proposition.   
 
More stringent qualifications for board members 
 
In discussions, general managers, businessmen, and mayors were unanimous in recommending 
that more stringent qualification criteria and exclusion clauses be introduced in order to reduce 
Board politicization.  These included preventing board members from contesting other elected 
offices  for  a  certain  period,  requirements  for  educational  qualifications  and  professional 
background,  and  reservation  of  certain  proportion  of  Board  seats  for  representatives  of  the 
business community and consumer advocacy organizations. 
 
Given the primacy of clan politics in the Philippines, we are skeptical that any introduction of 
qualification criteria or exclusion clauses would fundamentally alter the dynamics of electoral 
politics, and hence Board politicization.  The experience of the three-term limit rule is evidence to 
this, with mayors and congressmen bringing in family members to stand in on their behalf during 27 
 
the mandatory waiting period.  Similarly, minority representation for consumer groups in the 
Board is unlikely to have much impact, and we can foresee that such a representation could get 
easily marginalized from the major decisions taken by the Board.    
 
Mergers of ECs 
 
NEA has been advocating the merger and consolidation of ECs to achieve economies of scale and 
to attract private sector interest.  Indeed many ECs are small and economically unviable, and 
consolidation is necessary on technical grounds.  However, the political economy framework 
alerts us to the risks entailed in increasing the size and therefore the rent-seeking potential of a 
cooperative.  ALECO is a case in point which after the merger became much more attractive to 
politicians.  ALECO also demonstrates the moral hazard problem with large ECs that may be 
deemed too big to fail.  
 
Greater NEA independence 
 
Greater regulatory independence for NEA is a standard technical prescription.  While NEA is not 
a  regulator  (the  ERC  is)  in  the  strict  definition  of  the  term,  it  does  have  considerable 
supervisory/regulatory  powers  and therefore  should  have  the  same  governance  structure  as  a 
regulator.  In theory, effective regulation requires that the regulatory regime be established by 
law, with the role of the regulators, the mode of their appointment, service conditions, powers, 
immunities, and responsibilities defined in law and implemented in a transparent manner.  The 
regulatory  budget  should  be  independent,  and  funding  should  be  secure.    All  regulatory 
procedures  should  be  well  defined  and  widely  publicized,  and  the  scope  of  government 
intervention in regulatory processes should be clearly specified by law.  Regulatory decisions 
should be thoroughly explained and made after a transparent and participative process that is open 
to all stakeholders and decisions should be subject to appeal before an appellate forum. 
 
Our analytical framework however, suggests that given the political economy of nested capture, 
NEA‘s interventions depend critically on the support of national politicians for their success, and 
giving  NEA  independence  in  this  political  context  would  potentially  deny  it  this  necessary 
support.  An independent regulator can only be effective if the overall political economy context 
provides a generally supportive environment; where this environment is not supportive, as in the 
Philippines,  regulatory  independence  is  unlikely  to  make  a  difference  and  is  probably  not 
sustainable.   
 
Reforms likely to work 
 
Institutional innovations in the less politicized ECs 
 
Given  that  ECs  are  a  suboptimal  institutional  design,  conversion  to  stock  corporations  and 
eventual privatization is the right strategy for the sector in a long run.  One step in this direction 
has been the attempted contracting out of cooperative management to the private sector.  These 
so-called Investment Management Contracts (IMCs) were conceived for cooperatives that could 
be turned around with management expertise and relatively low investment requirement from the 
private sector, and not those that required a substantial capital investment.  The program however, 
got derailed due to a variety of reasons, in particular political resistance from vested interests.  
For example, one attempted IMC, in PELCO III, was terminated because of violent protests by 
the employees of the cooperative who feared downsizing, and by political interference from the 
concerned mayors who were not paying their electricity bills.  Another in CASURECO IV failed 
because the EC Board was highly factionalized with members representing the different political 28 
 
clans in the province and the private party, Salcon Philippines, was unable to secure the support 
of rival factions.   
 
Our recommendation is that the choice of ECs in which IMCs are attempted should be informed 
by the political economy framework in addition to the technical criteria used to date.  Attempted 
IMCs in highly politicized ECs are likely to fail.  However, IMCs can and should be attempted in 
relatively less politicized ECs — ones that have relatively low rent-seeking potential, are in an 
area that has relatively less intense local political competition and  has high national political 
salience.  This would mean, somewhat ironically, that the IMC model is not recommended to 
situations  where  an  intervention  is  most  badly  needed.    It  is  highly  probable  that  the  same 
political economy factors that have created the performance problems in the first place would 
undermine  the  attempted  IMC  interventions  in those  worst-performing  ECs  –  here  the  usual 
dictum of the political economy of reform that a crisis creates incentives to reform is unlikely to 
hold.    Therefore,  a  management  intervention  may  be  more  suitable  for  those  ECs  whose 
performance is at the ―mid-range‖ of the performance variation, although as stated above, specific 
underlying conditions should be evaluated before a decision to apply an IMC is taken. Now there 
is a risk that the very act of introducing an IMC will increase the rent-seeking potential and 
salience of the EC as politicians can use the contract negotiations as a means of extracting rents.  
Nevertheless,  with  the  appropriate  safeguards,  IMCs  in  such  select  ECs  can  have  important 
demonstration effects for the eventual institutional transformation of the sector.       
 
Increasing consumer voice 
 
Although  some  civil  society  actors  who  advocate  ―popular  democracy‖  and  work  with 
cooperatives in other sectors tend to see ECs as a variant of cooperatives which should be run on 
the basis of the ―voices of the popular sector‖ (consumers, in this case), evidence of effective 
consumer  activism  is  limited.    This  is  understandable  given  the  collective  action  problem 
expected in the nature of the electricity distribution service.  The business sector, by virtue of 
being organized, may be a partial answer to this problem.  Polls have shown that the unreliable 
and insufficient supply of power at reasonable cost is a major perceived obstacle to improving the 
investment climate in the Philippines. This sentiment was echoed by some of the business sector 
representatives we interviewed for this study.  But here again, there are certain built-in obstacles 
which may be difficult to overcome, at least in some localities.  First, in a large number of small 
ECs, the weight of the business sector (commercial and industrial users) among the EC clientele 
is limited, and some of the large businesses (e.g., a large mining company in Toledo City, in the 
catchment area of the ―best-managed‖ CEBECO III) supply their own electricity or rely on their 
own back-up generators (e.g., a large sugar mill operator in Bacolod).  Second, given the nature 
of the Philippine political economy often characterized with local factionalism cutting across not 
only political-partisan but also economic-business lines, mobilization of the business sector could 
simply  amplify  the  political  divide  that  may  be  undermining  the  EC‘s  governance  and 
management.    Nevertheless,  increasing  consumer  voice  through  the  creation  of  advisory  and 
supervisory  fora  with  participation  of  sub-groups  of  consumers  with  the  greatest  stakes  in 
improved  services,  notably  the  business  community,  can  provide  some  of  the  much-needed 
checks  and  balances  and  improve  the  governance  of  ECs.    Palawan‘s  power  commission 
discussed earlier is a promising initiative that also has the support of the Philippine Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry who are viewing it as a pilot which can be replicated in other ECs.  Our 
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